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Abstract— Safety is an important consideration in human-
robot interactions (HRI). Robots can perform powerful move-
ments that can cause hazards to humans surrounding them. To
prevent accidents, it is important to identify sources of potential
harm, to determine which of the persons in the robot’s vicinity
may be in greatest peril and to assess the type of injuries
the robot may cause to this person. This survey starts with a
review of the safety issues in industrial settings, where robots
manipulate dangerous tools and move with extreme rapidity
and force. We then move to covering issues related to the
growing numbers of autonomous mobile robots that operate
in crowded (human-inhabited) environments. We discuss the
potential benefits of fully autonomous cars on safety on roads
and for pedestrians. Lastly, we cover safety issues related to
assistive robots.
I. INTRODUCTION
Robots can produce powerful and very rapid movements
through a large operational space. Hazard threats arise from
unintended contact between these robots and humans. The
forthcoming paths of robots or robots’ arms are difficult
to predict (e.g., due to changing operational requirements).
Operators can be required to work in close proximity to the
robot system, while the machine actuators are being powered.
Furthermore, the operating spaces of two or more robots
can overlap, representing a threat to a human worker from
multiple sources.
Nowadays, humans work in close cooperation with robots
more than ever. In the resulting situations, contact is unavoid-
able between humans and robots. Indeed, in many instances,
it is actually desired. However, every contact creates the
potential for an accident. Careful thought needs to be given
to hazard assessment. Once the hazards are known, they can
be eliminated or reduced by design, safeguarding, control
and other methods.
Industrial robot interactions between humans and robots are
perhaps the most well-studied in current literature. However,
the emerging field of mobile and autonomous robots brings
new threats that have not yet been equally well-assessed.
When it comes to human safety, accident prevention can
always be improved. There have been many accidents caused
by HRI in the past. In the years to come, the number of
robots surrounding humans will greatly increase. Hence, the
potential danger from robots is greater than ever. The purpose
of this survey is to review possible hazards and overview the
methods used for accident risk reduction, as well as point out
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy of failures, adapted from [2]. Failures can be caused by
engineering or human worker errors, as well as environmental conditions.
the risks that did not exist before, but are being introduced
with the development of modern robotic systems.
II. HAZARDS OVERVIEW
In order to improve safety in HRI, one needs to determine
a) where the biggest danger lies, b) who is the most
endangered person in the interaction with a robot, c) what are
the consequences of potential injuries, and d) which factors
have the greatest impact on safety? In this section we address
each of these questions in turn.
A. Sources of injuries
According to [1], the causes of accidents caused by robots
can be grouped into three main categories: engineering
errors, human mistakes and poor environmental conditions.
Engineering errors include errors in the robot’s mechanics
(loose connections across parts, faulty electronics), errors
made by the controller (programming bugs, faulty algorithm),
etc. As a consequence, robots might, for example, fail to
stop, or a robot arm might achieve high, uncontrolled speed,
abrupt motion or acceleration. Accident caused by these
errors cannot be predicted even by the most attentive human
operator. On the other hand, human accidents, which are
more controllable, happen due to various factors, such as
inattention, fatigue, inobservance of the guarding procedures,
inadequate training programs or incorrect procedures for
initial robot start-up. Adverse environmental factors refer
to extreme temperature, poor sensing in difficult weather or
lighting conditions, all of which can lead to incorrect response
by the robot. Fig. 1 depicts the classifications of accident
sources mentioned above.
B. Endangered personnel
The person who operates the robot is the most at risk.
A comprehensive report based on cause-effect analysis of
32 accidents is presented in [3]. Its results show that
robot operators were subject to injuries in 72% of the
reported accidents. Maintenance workers accounted for 19%
Fig. 2. Classification of undesired contact scenarios between human and
robot [4].
of accidents, whereas programmers were least prone to
accidents (9% of cases). This directly corresponds to the
amount of time a person spends in the proximity of a robot,
as well as his or her level of expertise. Robot operators
are usually instructed to operate the robots in routine-like
situations only, and are therefore unprepared for unexpected
robot behavior. Maintenance workers are usually better trained
to handle such uncertainty. In many situations, however, they
are called when it is already known that the robot is not
functioning properly. They therefore maintain a higher level
of attention and are more precautious. Nevertheless, many
maintenance workers get injured. These injuries are generally
due to human mistakes, such as when another maintenance
worker activates a robot system to test it, while the first
worker is still in the robot cell. The robot programmers have
exceptional knowledge of robot operation, so their injuries
often fall into two categories. Most frequently, their injuries
are due to unexpected bugs in the software. Less commonly,
injuries can occur during the learning procedure. However,
they can teach and test robots at lower operating speeds and
hence reduce the likelihood of injury.
C. Classification of injuries
In [3] injuries are classified according to their type between
pinch (56%) and impact (44%) injuries. Pinch injury occurs
when a robot traps a worker between itself and an object,
whereas impact injury occurs when robot and worker collide.
Consequences are classified as minor with no lost work-time,
lost work-time injuries and fatal injuries. Based on results
shown in [3], pinch injuries seem to be of a more serious
nature than impact accidents.
A more recent approach gives a more detailed classification
of contact scenarios that could lead to an accident [4].
Contact can be an unconstrained impact, partially constrained
impact, constrained impact, clamping in the robot structure
or secondary impact. Fig. 2 depicts these scenarios. Each of
these impacts can be with a blunt or a sharp surface.
The International Organization for Standardization gives in
[5] an extensive classification of hazards based on their origin.
Mechanical hazards arise from unexpected or unintended
movements, unintended release of tools, rotational motion,
trapping of clothes or hair, becoming trapped within the
robot cell, etc. Electrical hazards comprise for instance
contacts with live parts or connections, or exposure to arc
flash. Thermal hazards are associated with hot surfaces or
exposure to extreme temperatures required by an ongoing
industrial process. Noise hazards are caused by loss of
balance, disorientation or inability to coordinate tasks through
communication. Other common hazards include vibration,
radiation, hazards created by the use of dangerous materials,
hazards coming from the dangerous environment in which
robot is used (e.g., while trying to avoid a sharp edge, a worker
comes in contact with a hot surface), and some combination
of these factors.
Hazards associated with robots are well recognized, but the
sources of hazards are frequently unique to a particular robot
system. Not all of the identified hazards apply to all robots, nor
is the level of risk associated with a given hazardous situation
the same for each robot. Regulations defined by standards
are thus ambiguous and not easily applicable. Designing
measures that are robot and context specific may be one way
of ensuring safety in constrained settings, such as industrial
settings, but it falls short of ensuring safety in HRI in a
generic way. This makes the problem of ensuring safety in
human-robot interactions difficult.
III. INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS
Industrial robots were introduced in order to replace human
workers performing dangerous, difficult, dull, monotonous and
dirty tasks. In the past, these dangerous workplaces caused
human workers injury and disease. Some health hazards that
affect human workers in workspaces are toxic fumes, heat,
radiation, noise, physical injuries and so on. In automated
production systems, robots are deployed in large numbers
for assembly, handling, welding and coating tasks. Robots
thereby not only improve safety, but also productivity in
heavy industry. However, as described in the previous section,
robots can also represent a hazard for the people surrounding
them. This section emphasizes accidents caused by robots in
industry and gives an overview of safety measures proposed
by current standards.
There are many standardization bodies dealing with the
safety in human-robot interactions, but the most influential
ones are the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
ISO 10218 is the most recent set of standards regarding
the safety in industrial robots [5], [6]. The European Union
has adopted it without any changes. The American standards
manual ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 was made public in 1999 [7].
It is widely used both in the United States and abroad
(e.g., it has been translated to Japanese and used there). It
was reaffirmed in 2009 without changes. Its newest version,
ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012 is currently undergoing public review
and will be made available soon [8].
Accidents related to industrial robots happen most fre-
quently when the human worker is inside the work cell while
the robot is operating. Additionally, incidents can occur during
servicing or programming the robot. Ideally, robots should be
safe to humans regardless of failure or even misuse. In reality,
perfect safety records in all contingencies are not feasible for
machines that have to deliver performance in terms of cutting,
welding, weight lifting, etc. A trade-off between performance
and safety is therefore necessary.
One of the commonly used safety measures in a robot
work cell is constructing a physical safety barrier around
the robot. The main purpose of building the barrier is to
safeguard the work cell against access by humans, while the
robot is in operation. Safeguards can be fixed (e.g., safety
fences) or movable (e.g., gates, flaps). Physical safeguards are
complemented by non-physical safeguards (e.g., light curtains,
scanners and safety mats). The American National Standard
for safety requirements in industrial robots explicitly states
that the most effective mean of safeguarding against injury is
to shut the robot system off upon human entry in the robot
work cell [9]. A safety fence usually has one or more gates
attached to it, through which humans enter the robot work cell
exclusively. An interlock device is incorporated into the gate,
which stops the robot operation if the gate is opened. Closure
of the gate does not resume the robot operation automatically.
In accordance with [6], automatic operation shall be initiated
from outside the safeguarded space and it should only be
possible when all associated safeguards are active.
Means shall be provided to establish a restricted space
around the robot. When it is not feasible to guard the robot
work cell, limiting measures shall be used. The robot shall
either have mechanical and electro-mechanical axis limiting
devices, or software-defined limits to robot motion. Software-
defined limits define a geometric shape (i.e., zone) that is
used to either limit the motion of the robot within its interior,
or limit the motion from entering this zone [5].
Danger to the human workers can further be reduced by
proper installation of a robot system. By building high floor
surfaces for covering the cables, the likelihood of tripping
and falling over them is minimized. Restricted and operating
spaces shall be established and clearly marked, as well as traf-
fic routes (e.g., pedestrian aisles, visitor routes, etc.). Access
and safe pathway to support services (electricity, gas, water),
control systems, service and cleaning shall be provided [6].
Special attention needs to be devoted to the recovery from
a failure. Loss of power or variations in power shall not
result in a hazard. Re-initiation of power must not lead to
any motion, as defined in [5]. Upon recovery, robot operation
shall be re-initiated manually. Start and restart of the robot
system shall be simple operations, and shall require relevant
safety and protective measures to be functional. Location of
actuating controls shall be chosen carefully, so as to prevent
unintended operation. Status of actuating controls shall be
clearly indicated (e.g., power on, fault detected, etc.).
In many cases, a collaboration between worker and robot
is required. Therefore, it is not always possible to shut the
robot off. A good solution is to equip the robot with force-
torque sensor along with a force-torque control techniques,
as described in [10], [11]. The force-torque sensor provides
the amount and direction of the force and the moment, which
is then used to control the robot’s movement considering its
maximum allowable velocity.
In addition to safety control through force-torque sensors,
the robot shall operate at slow speed mode when a human
is present in a robot cell. ISO 10218 states that safe slow
speed for a robot needs to be limited to 0.25 m·s−1. However,
the size, configuration and environment of the robot to be
guarded change the effectiveness of the safety techniques.
Under certain environmental conditions or applications (such
as programming or teaching), safe slow speed can be as
low as 0.1 m·s−1 to 0.2 m·s−1 [12]. On the other hand, the
authors of [4] criticize the limit of 0.25 m·s−1, saying that
it is unnecessarily restrictive and as such greatly limits the
robots’ performance. In these two examples, the speed limit
proposed by the standard does not generalize well to the
variety of applications and scenarios. Hence, standards might
be too loose and too general to apply easily, or they might
require technical expertise beyond the user’s capability [13].
To further demonstrate this difficulty, and also illustrate the
previously mentioned software-defined limits, we refer to
Section 5.12.3 from ISO 10218-1 [5]. It states that once set,
safety-rated software limits shall always become activated
upon robot power-up. There is, however, a possibility that a
person installing a robot does not abide by the installation
manual, and thus the software limits never get set.
Although the safe speed limits exist, human proximity
to the robot can still be dangerous. Motions that pass
near singularities can produce high axis speeds, despite
the limits. These high speeds can be unexpected by an
operator. Singularities should be avoided if possible. If not,
the robot motion should be stopped and a warning should be
provided prior to the robot passing through or correcting for
a singularity. However, in some cases the singularities can
be controlled without creating any hazardous motion [5].
Many approaches that endow the robot work cell with
multiple sensors (e.g., proximity sensors, area detectors,
cameras) to help determine that a human entered the vicinity
of the robot have been studied in the literature. For example,
Kulic and Kroft studied approaches that use this information
to replan on the fly a path that minimizes chances of
collision [14]. There are also industrial products based on
the same principle, such as ABB’s SafeMove [15]. Despite
these achievements, adjusting the plan of the robot on the
fly remains a challenge. While there exist control methods
to replan on-line trajectories, software of industrial robots is
not flexible and relies on predefined trajectories. To endow
industrial robots with flexibility will hence require a complete
redesign of the software provided currently by the main
robotics manufacturers.
Apart from ISO 10218, the new ANSI/RIA R.15.06-2012
regulations will also give specific guidelines for collaborative
robot applications [8]. It will be the first time that the
collaboration is allowed by the American standard since
the ANSI/RIA R.15.06-1999 prohibited a man in the loop
with a robot in 1999. As the technology advances in terms
of safety sensors and robot control, it has allowed man to
be reintroduced in the loop. It will however be an optional
Fig. 3. Human-robot-cooperation for handling tasks. Inside a regular robot
cell which is secured by light curtains, the robot handles gear boxes at
regular speed in fully automated mode. Upon a human approaching the light
curtain, the robot goes in the reduced-speed mode. The worker grasps the
safety switch which activates the force-torque sensor. The worker guides the
robot almost effortlessly by its handle [16]. (Fraunhofer IPA, Stuttgart)
feature, only available on new robots and robot systems.
Fig. 3 shows one example of an industrial robot that
complies to ISO 10218 international standard and implements
some of the safety measures we described above. The robot
shown there serves as a human precision augmentation tool,
and stretches from fully automated operation to acting as a
servo-controlled balancer. The example shows the heavy gear
box, that is grasped by the robot and softly balanced, so that
worker can insert it precisely in the housing [16].
There are more potential ways to protect the human
operators in the work cell, while loading and unloading the
work parts in the processing operations. During this process,
a rotary table can be used to transport raw materials from the
human workers to the robot and finished work parts back to
the workers. A rotary table is advantageous in that it divides
the working space of the worker and the robot, reducing the
risk of collision with the robot.
Despite all the safety measures, accidents can still happen,
when least expected. ISO 10218-2 defines that every robot
shall have a protective stop function and an independent
emergency stop function [6]. It should be located at the
minimum (albeit safe) distance, such that the operator has
a quick, unobstructed access to it. Upon collision, robot
should perform a safety stop function and remain still until
manually reactivated. In this way, the damage it causes will
be minimized. However, it is not good practice to have the
robot immediately start moving in the other direction, away
from the person with whom it came in undesired contact.
In that case, the robot could possibly collide with another
person who might be nearby and was not expecting a sudden
change in the robot’s moving trajectory.
Determining adequate reactive behavior when the robot
enters in contact with humans is one of the many challenges
robotics will have to solve to ensure safety in dynamic
environments inhabited with humans. A two-dimensional
tactile sensor has the ability to detect pressures and their
two-dimensional distribution. Contact sensing provides an
important and direct feedback for control, both in cases of
voluntary and involuntary interactions with the environment. It
can be applied to a robot as an artificial skin and used to safely
stop a robot’s movements in a human-centric perspective [17].
Tactile sensor placement is very important. It is worth noting
that approaches that put tactile sensors along the main segment
of the robot do not bring more information than would be
provided by a force/torque sensor placed at the joint. Having
tactile sensing on parts of the robot segments that bend or
retract would be more useful, as it may allow to detect if a
human limb got hooked in-between two retractable parts of
the robot.
IV. MOBILE ROBOTS
A variety of mobile robotics are rapidly emerging. Unlike
the industrial robots, in this case there is neither a dedicated
robot workspace, nor trained personnel that might need to
enter that workspace in order to interact with the robot in one
way or another. Physical contact between humans and robots
is unavoidable and even desirable when it comes to service
or educational robots. Mobile robots are being integrated into
the human environment. It is a highly dynamic environment,
where humans move unpredictably and perform their everyday
activities. Mobile robots are meant to assist humans, without
jeopardizing their safety and exposing them to any hazard risk.
In general, this holds true, but robotic cars show a particular
danger due to their high mass and high energy movement.
There are still no standards dedicated to defining the safety
requirements in non-industrial robot settings. ISO 10218 could
partially be applied, as it defines collaborative requirements
between humans and robots. The International Organization
for Standardization has also devoted a few working groups
to developing standards for other settings, such as robots in
personal care, mobile service robots and medical robots. The
new ISO/TS 15066 (scheduled to be released in 2013) should
specify force and pressure limits for a safe contact between
human and robot [8]. One of the goals of the new standard
is to define metrics for expressing the relationship between
safety and productivity.
A. Mobile Robots in Dynamic Environments
In dynamic environments, safety needs to be guaranteed
without restricting robot system autonomy and flexibility.
Therefore, not many principles from industrial robots’ safety
standards are applicable. Robots deployed in dynamic environ-
ments rely heavily on their sensory system, which provides
them with perception of the environment around them. Robots
physically embody the link between perception and action.
In many applications, robot precision is of crucial impor-
tance, especially when discussing safety. Because no perfect
sensor exists, sensor readings are always accompanied by
measurement noise. Sometimes, sensor data can be mislead-
ing, and if a robot entirely relies on it, it can consequently
create a hazardous situation. Although information fusion is
a very old problem, it has become a very popular subject
in the last years. Multiple sensor data fusion is a process
which combines observations from multiple sources, with
the goal of providing robust and complete description of
the environment [18]. Sensor data is usually combined by
means of probabilistic filtering, which takes into account
uncertainties associated with each sensor (cf. [19]).
Fig. 4. DARPA LAGR vehicle equipped with stock dual stereo cameras,
two infrared sensors, laser range-finder, and a physical bumper along with
two drive-wheel encoders, an inertial measurement unit (IMU) and a global
positioning system (GPS) sensor [21].
Mobile robots can be equipped with different kinds of
sensors, such as ranging sensors (e.g., sonar, radar, laser,
capacitive), vision-based sensors, tactile sensors, wheel and
motor encoders, orientation and heading sensors, beacon-
based position sensors, etc. Two or more sensors can measure
the same physical quantity (e.g., distance from some object),
or they can be complementary (i.e., measuring different
quantities, or pointing in different directions, etc.). In either
case, data coming from sensors can be fused, in order to
get an integral perception of the environment and increase
confidence in sensed data (for definition of confidence, cf.
[20]). An example of a mobile robot equipped with multiple
sensors is given in Fig. 4.
Information about the environment is then used for local-
ization and planning purposes. One of the safety concepts
is based on eliminating contact between robots and other
objects (and especially humans). Using this as a limiting
parameter, sensor outputs are used to plan trajectories that
avoid obstacles, and detect other moving objects and avoid
collision with them as well. Optical sensors can track people
and their movements, compute dynamically safe zones and
adjust a robot’s speed and direction of movement to the given
situation. One possible solution was proposed in [22]. It
consists of two conventional cameras equipped with fisheye
lenses, which can cover the complete robot workspace and
provide a computationally effective alternative to a larger set
of cameras or rotational cameras. The two cameras work in
combination with a sophisticated background maintenance
technique, which enables the detection, identification and
tracking of moving objects and of humans with which the
robot might need to interact. This solution is also robust to
sudden changes in illumination.
In multiple robot settings, communication between robots
can further enhance safety. A robot can exchange locally
available information with other robots in its environment,
which might help it to make an intelligent and safe decision
about its action. For example, due to an obstructed view by
another robot, the first robot might overlook an approaching
dynamic object and in turn make an unsafe decision. If the
two robots exchange their sensor data among themselves,
it is possible to gain a more complete and accurate situa-
tional awareness through the results of a sensor data fusion
process [23]. Furthermore, a swarm of robots that mutually
communicate can form a system whose goal is to improve
safety in human-robot interaction. As shown in [24], a swarm
forming an intelligent sensor system could be placed inside a
piece of machinery to work as an inspection tool, increasing
the safety of machinery with respect to humans, as well as
limiting its downtime.
Care robots represent another growing market segment.
Whereas ISO 10218 targets the robots for industrial environ-
ments and collaborative operations of human workers with
robots, requirements for personal care robots have not been
considered. A new working group is currently approved to
formulate a new international safety standard for non-medical
personal care robots [25]. The new standard under the name of
ISO/DIS 13482 will deal with mobile servant robots, people
carrier robots, physical assistant robots, personal care robot
devices, and a few more. It shall provide risk assessment, as
well as risk reduction or elimination and testing methodology
for safety engineering procedures. At the time this survey
concluded, it was still under development.
B. Robotic Cars
Robotics and intelligent systems are getting more and
more involved in the automotive industry. Probably the
most important goal for their involvement is improving the
safety of passengers and other people, as well as increasing
the performance of the vehicles. However, they are also
introducing new types of hazards, and sometimes present a
hazard themselves. In this section we give an overview of
how robots improve and decrease the safety in transportation.
We have been witnesses of many car accidents and fatalities
arising from them. In 2010, 32,778 people died in motor
vehicle traffic crashes in the United States, according to the
U.S. Department of Transportation [26]. Statistical projection
showed an estimated number of 32,310 fatalities in 2011
[27], which would represent a decline of about 1.7 percent
as compared to 2010. That is the lowest number of fatalities
registered since 1949 (30,246 fatalities in 1949 [26]).
In order to reduce the number of accidents, there has been
a lot of research conducted in the field of driver assistance.
Among the most investigated fields are the braking assistance
and collision avoidance systems. This is easily explicable
based upon human behavior. Specifically, humans easily
underestimate the speed of their vehicle and the distance
to the vehicle in front of them. Since the vehicles operate
at high speeds, and have enormous kinetic energy, injuries
arising from car accidents are often fatal. For instance, an
inattentive driver might overlook a stopped or a slowly moving
vehicle ahead, or underestimate its threat level until it is too
late. Another likely scenario is one of the major causes of
accidents on the highways. Essentially, in this scenario, the
distance to the vehicle ahead of the driver is not very large
(e.g., less than 50 m) at the moment when the front vehicle
suddenly starts to brake. The requirement for the driver of the
rear vehicle to detect an abrupt change in relative distance
and acceleration is high and this often leads to accidents due
to lack of attention, tiredness, fatigue, etc. These are just
some of situations where the collision avoidance and braking
assistance systems could be of crucial importance.
A number of measures for threat assessment in collision
avoidance systems have been proposed throughout the lit-
erature. One common measure is time-to-collision, which
represents the time it would take for a collision to happen at
the current speed, distance and trajectory associated with the
closest vehicle ahead [28], [29]. A second common time-based
measure is a time headway. It specifies how much time the
driver has to brake in case the car ahead suddenly brakes at
its maximum deceleration level [30]. A more recent measure,
time-to-last-second-braking [31], quantifies the danger or
threat level more objectively and assesses the urgency level for
the required protective action, e.g. braking. Related distance-
based measures also exist, such as projected minimum distance
during a collision avoidance process [32]. An important
deceleration-based measure is required deceleration, which
measures a constant deceleration level required to avoid a
read-end collision [33].
Many warning and overriding algorithms have been devel-
oped based on the threat assessment measures. Their goal
is to issue a threat warning to the driver at the right time,
or to issue an overriding command (e.g., automatic braking)
if there is no more time left for the human driver to react,
following human reaction times [34]. Lee and Peng explain
in [35] the algorithms proposed from researchers at Mazda,
Honda, JHU and Jaguar, and give their subsequent evaluations.
The evaluation results show that these algorithms are still far
from being perfect—due to their having a low true positive
rate, they are often seen by drivers as a nuisance. For these
reasons, authors of [31] claim that warning and overriding
criteria based on time-to-last-second-braking measure provide
more appropriate warning and more effective overriding at
the last moment.
Recent research takes a different approach to the same
problem. Cabrera et al. propose in [36] a time-to-last-second-
acceleration algorithm, that represents a warning algorithm for
the driver of the front vehicle. It computes the time left before
the extreme evasive action (i.e., full throttle acceleration)
needs to be performed by the driver of the front vehicle, in
order to avoid the rear-end collision.
These algorithms are directly related to the safety of the
human driver and the passengers in the vehicle. For vehicles
that have the above-mentioned collision avoidance systems
enabled, we may say that they are semi-autonomous, since
they have an automatically controlled braking and stopping
system. Braking decisions are intelligently made and are
based on the car’s sensor readings. Hence, this is an exact
application of robotic systems for improving human safety.
Whereas most of the automotive vendors focus on colli-
sion avoidance and adaptive cruise control systems (which
basically follow a car ahead at a given distance), most of
the academic laboratories that are in the field of intelligent
vehicles, as well as Google, seek to produce a totally
autonomous system. There are many people in the field who
claim that autonomous vehicles are going to decrease the
number of accidents and eventually perform better than human
drivers [37], [38]. For instance, whereas humans have the
ability to track only a few objects in the environment at once,
robots can do much more. Having a software that can track
one object, tracking many objects simultaneously is not much
harder. In fact, the autonomous car and the software on the car
are, in the long run, potentially better than people in keeping
track of a lot of elements going on in the environment [37].
However, having cars that drive themselves autonomously
represents a new level of threat that previously did not exist,
not just for the passengers in the car, but also for the whole
environment—and most importantly, humans in the surround-
ing environment. Cars operate at high speeds, so the accidents
in which they are involved often end up with casualties.
State-of-the-art autonomous vehicles are equipped with
a number of sensors, including radars, laser range-finders,
cameras, proximity sensors, global positioning systems (GPS),
inertial navigation systems [39], etc. They use sensory
information to localize themselves in the environment and
make distinctions between drivable surfaces and obstacles.
Sensors need to enable vehicles to see far ahead (approx.
150-200 m), so as to be able to drive fast and adjust their
speed in accordance with the situation on the road in good
time. Environments in which autonomous vehicles operate
are highly dynamic. Many objects are not found in maps and
cannot be modeled with respect to sensors output, as their
presence is highly unpredictable.
There are situations when not even humans can avoid
accidents (cf. [26] for statistics). Sometimes there is just not
enough time to brake. Take as an example a child chasing
a ball into the street. Even when assuming the robotic car
was obeying all traffic rules and was actively aware of the
surroundings, upon the kid or the ball appearing from behind
a fence, bush, car or other obstruction, an accident could
simply be unavoidable. However, since human reaction time
is quite long, under identical circumstances, the child might
have better chances to stay safe and get its ball if behind the
wheel was not a human driver, but a robot. In fact, current
robotic cars have more sensors and faster reaction times that
could potentially vastly outperform a human driver.
Bicycles also present a safety issue. In the worst case
situation, a cyclist can fall off their bike and stop immediately,
lying in the road. A vehicle following a bicycle has to
leave enough space to assure it can stop before such an
occurrence, including reaction time. As already mentioned,
reaction time should be better for robotic cars than for humans.
Humans generally do not leave enough space. They leave
even less space behind cars because cars actually cannot stop
instantaneously, and they brake as the other cars brake. If a
car hits another car at slow speeds, it is tolerable—nobody
will be seriously hurt. Hitting a cyclist or pedestrian at slow
speeds can mean death.
It is a real challenge to find a good balance between
colliding into someone a car might hurt and abrupt braking
because of an obstacle as small as a butterfly. No matter how
low a rate of accidents robotic cars manage to achieve, there
will always be their opponents. Questions of liability will
arise—is it the fault of the car owner, vehicle manufacturer or
even programmer who worked on a software? As a matter of
fact, the cause of accident might be easier to prove because of
all the cameras and measurement equipment, which are able
to record what is happening around the incident. A good long-
term solution might be to have a black box installed in each
autonomous vehicle, similar to airplanes. The effectiveness
and liability of safety measures for autonomous vehicles will
play a key role in the acceptance by society of robotic cars
in the years to come. However, this and other ethical issues
are beyond the scope of this survey.
The first license for driving an autonomous vehicle on
American public roads was recently issued [40]. It symbolizes
the safety plans set by Google, their employee training, system
functions and accident reporting mechanisms. It is, despite the
autonomy of the vehicle, a testing license, which demands the
presence of persons in the vehicle while testing it on the public
roads. This approval represents the first stepping stone towards
a massive involvement of autonomous vehicles in traffic.
These robots will certainly represent a phenomenon that will
get a lot of attention within the robotic safety community in
the years to come.
C. Miniature Mobile Robots
Based on a totally different principle, miniature robots have
certainly contributed to safety in human-robot interaction.
Haddadin et al. emphasize in [41] the impact of a robot’s
mass and velocity on the injury level. Their conclusion
is that the best way to reduce the injury potential is by
reducing a robot’s weight. Mondada et al. recognized the
potential of miniature mobile robots almost two decades
ago [42]. Miniature robots had a great impact on control
and evolutionary algorithm investigation over the last two
decades. Bigger and heavier robots are not very safe for the
investigation of unreliable algorithms. Because of their mass
and moving force, the damage they can cause to the objects
around them, especially human beings, can be considerable.
Experiments with miniature robots can be performed in a
small arena safely and cost-effectively. If the control over a
miniature robot is lost, the robot will just end up in one of
the arena walls, and refrain from damaging anything in the
environment or itself.
The fact that most service and entertainment robots
present in home environment are small and not powerful has
ensured that these interactions are practically safe. However,
miniaturization of the robot is not the ultimate solution. For
many jobs dedicated to robots, a robot’s weight and size is
crucial. Many robots need to apply certain (high) force in
order to perform their operations. In these scenarios, miniature
robots are not applicable.
D. Assistive Devices
Approaches using robotic assistance for human rehabilita-
tion, motor learning and recovery are common in the literature.
Robots can assist, enhance, evaluate and document orthopedic
and neurological rehabilitation of movements. Rehabilitation
devices for supporting rehabilitation of arm motion after
stroke [43] and of locomotion after spinal surgery [44] are
among the most advanced platforms. Commercial solutions,
such as Lokomat, are successful examples of commercial
assistive devices used in regular therapy sessions. While the
forces that these robots can apply remain small, hence limiting
greatly the risk of damaging the assisted limb, safety issues
are a primary concern when designing wearable devices at
large (including the design of devices to support or extend
human senses). Limiting the forces does not guarantee safety
as it is difficult to determine what is the minimal amount of
force/torque that the device can safely apply when it is so
close to the human body, as sometimes a small force applied
at a very weak point can lead to serious injury or death.
When designing assistive devices, safety issues arise from
the use of shared control. If an accident happens, who of
the machine or the human should be held responsible, since
they both share the control? The interested reader can refer
to [45] for a discussion on these issues. Consider wheelchairs
driven by brain-machine interface [46]; unless one records
all data input and output from the system (as proposed in
Section IV-B), it will be difficult to determine whether the
person gave the wrong command or the system misinterpreted
the person’s intention.
V. CONCLUSION
Robots are slowly and increasingly pervading in many
segments of human lives. They are becoming part of our liv-
ing environment. While useful, robots also represent a poten-
tial hazard. They can move their arms or bodies forcefully and
very rapidly, and often manipulate dangerous and sharp tools.
This represents a threat to all living agents that are surrounding
robots. If humans are present in the robots’ proximity, the
situation gets even more dangerous.
Industrial robots are usually installed inside a guarded
work cell and their operation is regulated with standards.
Relaxation of some of the rules defined by standards makes
the issue of safety a prominent one. Therefore, defining robot
and context specific safety guidelines needs to be urgently
addressed by the scientific and industrial community.
Mobile robots rely on multiple sensors and sophisticated
control strategies in order to ensure safety in their interactions
with humans. Although robot safety has long been an issue
of concern, accidents arising from this type of interaction
threaten to grow to a significant number with the growing
number of mobile robots in the human environment.
Without any doubt, autonomous vehicles represent one of
the areas that will have the biggest impact in the near future.
Many experts in the field claim that autonomous vehicles are
going to increase traffic safety. Still, they also represent a new
threat. Therefore, there is an immediate need for the design
of clear guidelines and of safety measures to ensure that
these new set of autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles
increase safety on our roads, as opposed to the converse.
As robots become more complex, with more and more
degrees of freedom (e.g., humanoid robots), the risk of trap-
ping in-between two joints will increase; higher complexity in
robot’s range of motion will make it more difficult for humans
to predict the robot’s displacement. To address the numerous
challenges enumerated before requires i) the design of new
sensing technology and of fast sensor fusion algorithms to
track multiple moving targets in real time, ii) to achieve robust
detection of human motion in order to build good predictive
systems, iii) to ensure robust detection of contact between
robots and surrounding living agents in multiple points, and
iv) to develop fast responsive controllers that can replan
trajectories in complex, cluttered environment in real time.
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